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RECENT DECISIONS

LABOR LAW -AssocIATIONs - SuABILITY OF UNINCORPORATED LABOR
UNION IN ACTION AT LAW FOR DAMAGES - Plaintiff sued defendant trade
union, an unincorporated association, in its association name in a county court
of North Carolina for damages arising out of its action in expelling him from
the union, putting his name on a blacklist, and obtaining his discharge from
employment. North Carolina had no enabling statute permitting suit against
unincorporated associations in their association name. Service of process was
obtained upon the local union's secretary-treasurer. Judgment for the plaintiff
was taken by default, and plaintiff brought an action on the judgment in the
District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. The District
Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the union appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Held, that the union was properly sued
in its association name as a legal entity, that service of process upon the secretarytreasurer of the local union was sufficient to give the North Carolina court
jurisdiction over the union, and therefore that the resulting judgment was
entitled to full faith and credit. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Finishers' Jn,ternational Assn. v. Case, (App. D. C. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 56.
The approach taken by the court pursued two lines of inquiry: first, whether
the judgment of the county court was valid 1 according to North Carolina law;
secondly, whether the North Carolina court violated due process of law under
the United States Constitution by allowing the defendant association to be sued
as an entity. It is a general common-law rule that an unincorporated association
cannot, in the absence of statutory authorization, be sued in its association name.2
In support of this rule is the view that an association is not a person, either
natural or artificial, and therefore has no legal entity apart from its members,
so that all members must be made parties defendant in order to bring suit
against the association. 3 There is also a feeling on the part of the courts that
the power to sue or be sued as a legal entity is one of the privileges of corporate
1 The court pointed out, 93 F. (2d) 56 at 62, that it was inquiring as to the
validity of the North Carolina judgment according to North Carolina law, not sitting
in review of the North Carolina trial court. The court examined decisions of the
North Carolina courts and ascertained that unincorporated associations were suable
entities in that state, and that service of process upon an officer was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over the association. See Winchester v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 203 N. C. 735, 167 S. E. 49 (1932).
2 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877 (1905).
8 Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921); Picket
T. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906).
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bodies which can be acquired only by grant from the state. 4 To avoid the hardship involved by application of the rule requiring joinder of all members of
an association where suit is sought against an association having a large membership, courts of equity early devised the so-called representative actions. In proper
case~ a few members are made parties plaintiff or defendant as representative of
all, and the decree or judgment which determines their rights concludes all as
respects the common interest. 6 In order for this remedy to be available, it must
appear that there is a common interest, that it would be impracticable to join all
the members of the association, 6 and that those members brought in as representatives of a class fairly represent the interest or right involved.7 A claim or judgment established by suit against some members as representing themselves and
all others having the same interest is a charge upon the association funds. 8 This
traditionally equitable procedure has, under the influence of modern codes
providing for one civil action, been extended to legal actions where the case
involved unincorporated associations of large membership. 9 The inadequacy
4

American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers & Die Makers' Union, (C. C. Ohio,
898) 90 F. 598. And see Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions,"
33 YALE L. J. 383 (1923), in which it is asserted that the view that the capacity
to sue and to be sued in the firm or association name is a corporate privilege is the real
reason lying behind the denial of this privilege to unincorporated associations, rather
than that they are not legal entities; this is no reason at all but simply a statement of
the court's conclusion.
6
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. lbs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 .S. Ct. 692 (1915)
(suit to compel distribution of mortuary fund built up by contributions of many members for whom plaintiffs were representatives); Spaulding v. Evenson, (C. C. Wash.
1906) 149 F. 913 {suit against a committee, representatives of labor union, to restrain
unlawful conspiracy to interfere with complainant's business); and see Fitzpatrick v.
Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 392 {1896), in which it was held that where parties
are too numerous to bring all before the court, service of process on a part who act
for other members as well as themselves will be sufficient service upon the whole.
6
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. lbs, 237 U.S. 662, 35 S. Ct. 692 (1915).
7
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Union, (C. C.
Ohio, 1898) 90 F. 598 {leaders of organized strike held to fairly represent the union,
without regard to their official connection with it).
8
Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 271 Pa. 419,
II4 A. 377 (1921) {suit in equity to recover on a life insurance certificate issued by
fraternal benefit association); Maisch v. Order of Americus, 223 Pa. 199, 72 A. 528
(1909) {action on a debt).
9
Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N. E. 735 {1893); Colt v. Hicks, 97
Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (1932) {action at law against members of union representing all to recover insurance benefits); Branson v. Industrial Workers of the
World, 30 Nev. 270 at 290, 95 P. 354 (1908) {action at law against unincorporated
labor organization to recover damages for unlawful boycott of the plaintiff's business),
in which the court said: ''We think it was the intention of the legislature, by this
provision of the statute, to make the equity rule applicable to all proceedings in the
courts of this state, whether the same be of a legal or equitable nature. Under our code
provision, there is but one form of civil action, and legal and equitable distinctions,
so far as practice is concerned, are largely, if not entirely, done away with." But in
I
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of the common-law rule requiring joinder of all members and the limitatons of
the representative suit have led to widespread adoption of enabling statutes permitting unincorporated associations to sue and be sued in their association name
as legal entities, and this legislation has generally been sustained.10 Under such
legislation a wide variety of actions against labor unions as suable entities has
been permitted.11 Where there is an absence or failure of any specific statutory
method of service of process on the union, the courts will treat the association,
suable as such, as a quasi-corporation for the purpose of process and will approve
service of process upon any agent or representative of the association whose relationship to the association is such that it may reasonably be expected he will give
notice to the association.12 A further liberalization of the rules governing actions
against unincorporated associations was made by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the leading case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado- Coal
Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921), a similar
argument was rejected.
There has been considerable discussion as to just how far the statutes go. See,
for example, Lesar, "Class Suits and the Federal Rules," 22 MINN. L. REv. 34 (1937);
Moore and Cohn, "Federal Class Actions," 32 ILL. L. REv. 307 (1937), 555 (1938);
Eagleton, "Proposed 'Parties' and 'Joinder' Sections for Federal Pleading Rules," 3
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 597 (1936); Wheaton, "Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants," 19 CoRN. L. Q. 399 (1934); 37 CoL. L. REv. 462 (1937); I Mo. L.
REv. 99 (1936); 21 CoRN. L. Q. 371 (1937) (New York act).
10 United States Heater Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 129 Mich. 354, 88 N. W.
889 (1902); Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green,
210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.
(2d) 756 (1931); Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, 79 Vt. 1, 63 A. 938 (1906), noted
in 20 HARv. L. REv. 58 (1906).
11 Bruns v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, (Mo. App. 1922) 242 S. W. 419
(action against union to recover insurance benefits); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So. 205 (1934) (same); Clark v. Grand Lodge of
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d) 404 (1931)
(same); Grand International Brotherhood v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923)
( action against union for wrongful expulsion of member or for securing his discharge
from employment); Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 A. 165 (1906)
(same); Johnson v. International of United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners,
54 Nev. 332, 16 P. (2d) 658, 18 P. (2d) 448 (1932) (same); Local No. 65 v.
Nalty, (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) 7 F. (2d) 100 (same); Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss.
663, 147 So. 479 (1933) (union held suable as garnishee defendant); St. Germain v.
Bakery, etc. Workers Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166 P. 665 (1917) (action against union
to recover damages for -unlawful strike); Bricklayers, etc., Union v. Seymour Ruff
& Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931) (same); Bowers v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 187 Minn. 626, 246 N. W. 362 (1933)
( action against union to recover for fraudulent sale of bonds).
12 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So. 205
(1934) (service of process on secretary of local lodge of defendant association held
service on the association). Without discussing the relationship to the union of the
person served, service of process in the following cases was held to constitute service
upon the union: Unkovich v. New York Cent. R. R., 114 N. J. Eq. 448, 168 A. 867
(1933) (service on business agent of union); Irwin v. Possehl, 145 Misc. 907, 261
N. Y. S. 164 (1932) (service on president of the union).
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Co. 18 In that case, which was an action against an unincorporated labor union
to recover damages for violation of the Sherman Act, the court held, following
the English view,1'' that the union was suable in its association name as a legal
entity without any enabling statute, the theory being that large and powerful
labor unions have become in effect quasi-corporations for the purposes of suit.15
The holding of the principal case, in which the court relied strongly upon the
reasoning of United Mine JiVorkers v. Coronado Coal Co., represents a significant application of the rule laid down in that case. It is at once obvious that
the results of the holding are far-reaching; for it enables an aggrieved party to
obtain a money judgment against a local union and then bring an action upon
that judgment in another jurisdiction where the union has larger or more accessible funds. While this holding follows logically from the application of the
corporate concept established in the Coronado case, certain differences exist between the great labor organizations and corporations of comparable size and
scope in regard to purposes, internal organization, and the measure of .financial
and political control exercised by the central authority. The consequences of
imposing upon unincorporated unions a measure of responsibility for acts of
agents and representatives similar to that imposed upon corporations may be
vastly different.16 Whether suability of unincorporated unions is based upon
statutory authorization or upon judicial relaxation of the common-law rules,
the consequences will be about the same. It is arguable, however, that the rule
should rest upon the public policy, upon a conception of the social purposes to
be effected, rather than upon analogy to the corporate organization.
Thomas E. Wilson

259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922).
Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [ 1901] A. C. 426.
15 The court pointed out in support of this holding that the unity of action,
wealth and power of the great labor organizations was comparable to that of corporations; that legal recognition of their existence and development had been granted in
tlie. form of a great variety of Congressional and state legislation aimed at fostering their
usefulness and protecting their members; that the influence upon the law side of
litigation of the representative suit was an indication of the acceptance of the suable
character of such organizations; that it was undesirable for organizations so powerful
to injure private rights to be able to use their assets free from liability for injuries by
torts committed in the course of their activities. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 at 385-392, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922).
16 See Megaarden, "The Danbury Hatters Case-Its Possible Effect on Labor
Unions," 49 AM. L. REV. 417 (1915), discussing Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522,
35 S. Ct. 170 (1915), in which the court upheld a money judgment obtained against
certain members of the hatters union in a representative capacity for violation of the
Sherman Act. The writer points out the anomalous character of a holding compelling
union members to respond in damages for the wrongful acts of those over whom they
have very little control-as little control as the stockholders of a corporation have over
the officers and agents of the corporation.
18
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